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n· ThE SUP:c:::r.i.s COUH7 OF Trill STJJ.TE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKS CITY CORP., a ~unicioal 
corporatio~ of the State of Ut~h ) ) 
) 
Plaintiff ) 
and Respondents ) 
vs. 
D. WILLIAl\I LAYTON and HEIBr! 
LAYTOF, his wife, 
Defendants 
and Appellants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
APPELLAHT 1 S BRIEF 
CASE NO. 
STATEi.ia!T OF THC: NATURE OF THE CASE 
This c&se concerns part of an alleged street which 
was abandoned by non use. 
DISPOSITIO:r r:r LOVIER COURT 
The lower Court issued an order granting plaintiff's 
claim to "Pearl Street'' in spite of the obvious fact that 
it was based on a private claim of a noncontributor. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant appellants seek an order correctly stating 
the law on the subject of noncontributors rights to an 
abandoned street in a plat recorded under Chapter XIII 
Section 2070 S6, Section 2071 S7, Laws of Utah Territory 
1888; chapter L. Sections l,~,3,4,5,6, Laws of Utah Terri-
tory 1890 as amended by Laws of Utah Territory 1894 
Chapter XVIII, VACATING OR CiiA~,·GI~TG PLATS Sections 6,7, 
8,9,10 and 11. These sections clearly show O':mer can change. 
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2 
Inasmuch as Section ':0,070 S6, cited 2.bo·Je, became 
part of Section 1116 of Title 25 HIGH~AYS Ch~pter 1, 
R.s. of Utah 1898 
General Provisions/which stated: 
Provided, that a road not used or Tiorked for 
a perioc1 of five years ceases to be a highway. 
and the said section 1116 was in the nature of a self 
executing provision of the law, defendant appellant 
feels that plaintiff respondent is not properly before 
the court. The right of the public to this so called 
street was obviously lost in 1902 throui;h the above 
cited section. 
STATEi,,P"T OF FAGTS 
Two 5 acre parcels of land namely lots 20 & 21 
Riverside Plat were subdivided by a single man named 
A. F. Lawson during May, 1897. This becane knovm as 
Subdivision of lots 20 & 21 Riverside Plat. It is 
located in Salt Lake County in Section 14 Township 
1 South, Range 1 Vie st SLB&Tu: ( 1700 South to approx. 
1800 South (railroad) and 900 'Sest to 1045 \'lest. It 
has not been developed on a lot basis. Defendant 
appellant has owned all of Bloc"k 4 of this subdivision 
for nearly 25 years, and has spent several thousand 
dollars filling with gravel (flood insurance) and 
fencing it. In all that time no one has seriously 
questioned defen'.iant aprellants' possession. The above 
was gener.s.lly conceded by plaintiff respo::·:d,,nt throue;hout 
the record. 
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POINT I 
Plaintiff respondent has no right. A. F. Lawson's 
offer to dedicate was dated May 17, 1897. The 5 year 
non use or worked provision (section 1116 R. s. of Utah 
1898) cut off any rights the public rmy have had on 
May 17, 1902. 
This statement is based on and supported by many 
decisions of the Supreme Court of Utah, namely: 
Roy s. Ludlow Inv. Co. v. Salt Lake County etal. 
28 U2d 139, 499 P2d 283 (1972) 
1. Highways, key 79(2) 
North Temple Invest. Corp. v. Salt Lake City Corp. 
26 U2d 306, 489 P2d 106 (1971) 
2. Dedication, key 34. 
lfa llory v. Taggart 24 U2d 267, 470 P2d 254 ( 1970) 
2. Municipal Corporations, key 663(2) 
3. Dedication, key 31 
Sowadski v. Salt Lake County 36 U 127, 104 Pac 
117 ( 1909) 
3. Dedication--Abandonment--County Roads. 
4. Dedication--Abandonment--limited fee. 
5. Easements--Abandonment of highway--effect 
on private rights. 
And decisions in other states which had a similar 
limitation law namely: 
Floyd Van Sant, v, City ofSeattle 237 P2d 130 (1955) 
1. Highways, key 79 ( 4) 
, •• self executing. 
2. Highways, key 79(7) 
6. Dedication, lrey '"?l 
Howell v, King County, 0:/ashington etal 134 P2d 80 (1943) 
1. Hi~hways, key 79(4) 
2. Hi~hways, key 79(4) 
3. High#ays, key 79(4) 
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Hislop v. Lincoln County, Oregon 437 P2d 847 (1968) 
and a host of others. 
POINT II 
In spite of what has already been said on the subject, 
defendant appellant calls the Court's attention to the 
wording of Section 1 of Chapter 50, Laws of Utah 1890, 
which states: 
;:s!~b~~a~~e~h~YT;~~i~~;;r~~rU~~~:Le~;=~ai~ve 
shall be lawful for any o-:mer or owners ofany 
land, •••• to lay out and plat such land 
into lots, streets, alleys, and public places. 
This section is simply a statement in writing indi-
cating the manner in which an intelligent person can 
/"i dispose of his property in an orderly manner, the same 
way it could have been done for years. It is in no way 
a collJJl'land, nor a demand. That there may be other methods 
of doing the same thing must surely be true. They may 
not have been the most efficient nor the most logical, 
but there were :many land transactions taking place else-
where in the world before the laws of 1890 were passed. 
The fact that Section 5 indicates that if s. party elected 
not to do it that way, they could elect to forfeit to the 
County in which such town or addition is located, a sum 
not excee'iing three hundred dollars. Even at that, an 
out-of-state property owner might have escaped paying such 
forfeit altogether. 
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"Ar '·C ,, T concerning the Laying Out a~1Flattlrg of Towns." 
However, it is also obvious from a careful readin" 
0 
of the title of the act v1hich itself says "Towns", and 
Sectj_ons 4 anrl 5 also say "Towns", that it may very well 
h'J.ve meant what it said "' an .... only referred to land within 
a town inasmuch as Art. VI Sec. 22 Constitution of Utah 
states: 
• no bill shall be passed containing more 
than one subject, which-shall be clearly ex-
pressed in its title 
Nowhere in the title of this act is there anything 
said which could be construed as a basis for passing 
title to property. Therefore the statement in Sec. 4 
which states: 
• sufficient to vest the fee of such 
parcels of land 
is far beyond the subject included in the title of the 
act an1 therefore unconstitutional. 
POINT III 
Since the defendant appellants' predecessor did at 
one time offer for the Cou~ty's consideration, a Subdivi-
sion of some land he owned in 1897, and even though it 
had never been accepted, nor used, nor workej, the plaintiff 
respondent co!'ltends that what was once known as "Pearl 
street'' directly east of lots 18 to 26, Block 4 Sub. of 
lots 20 & 21 Riverside Plat should now, more than 80 years 
later, be opened to allow the party to the east of defen-
dant anpellants' land the use of 33 feet to which they 
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(a noncontributor) never heli title, never paid taxes 
on, have never oeen in possession of, nor h:i_ve any need 
in order to have access to their property. Title 25 
Chapter 1 Sec. 1120 Revised Statutes of Utah 1898 states: 
By taking or accepting land for a highway, the 
public acquires only the right of way and incidents 
necessary to enjoying and maintaining it. A 
transfer of land bounded by a highway passes the 
title of the person whose estate is transferred 
to the center of the highway. 
Tllilt this position is totally without merit is 
shown by: 
Niel v. Independent Reality Co. 317 Ivio 1235, 
298 SW 363, 70 A.L.R. 550. 
In an extensive discussion, the lv\1-ssouri Supreme 
Court (Div. ~o.l) on Sept, 15, 1927 held: 
Hip:hways, key 22 --v:o.cation of street--reversion of fee, 
1. If a street is taken wholly from one man's 
property, the fee upon its vacation, reverts 
to the original owner or his grantees. 
2. A statutory provision that upon vacation 
of a dedicated street the land shall be 
attached_to the ground bordering on the 
street, and all title thereto shall vest 
in the persons 0·1ming the property on each 
side thereof in equal proportions, must be 
held to apply only in case the proprietors 
on each side of the street contributed to 
the dedication; not where the street was 
wholly dedicated by the owner of property 
abutting on one side of it. 
Boundaries, key 13 --highway--title to center--
assumption. 
3. The rule that the abutting ovmers hold 
title to the center of a street was founded 
upon the assurr.ption that the owners had 
each contribute~ a~ually ta the street. 
Dedication, key 19 -- nf str8et--vh~t c0~veyed. 
4. Under a ccm~on-law dedicct1on of land 
for a street, the put,l:ic o;cnuires a mere 
easel>'.ent. 
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Dedic9.tion, l<ey 19 --hie;hways, key 22--statutory 
requirem~nts--effect. -
6. Statute requiring one dedica.ting land 
for streets to convey the fee for public 
uses in trust and for the uses therein 
expressed or intended and for no other 
use or purpose, does not require a convey-
ance in fee simple, but merely a trust for 
street use, so that upon vacation of the 
street, the title will revert to the dedi-
cator. 
Constitutional law, key507--vesting title to vacated 
street in noncontributor. 
7. ','!here, by statute, land dedicuted for 
street purposes is solely for public use, 
no portion of a street which is dedicated 
wholly by one person can, upon its vacation, 
be vested in one whose land abuts upon the 
street, but who neither personally nor 
through his predecessors in title contributed 
a.nything to the street, where the Constitu-
tion prohibits the taking ofprivate property 
for private use. 
8. Statutes in pari materia must be construed 
together and given a construction, if possible, 
which violates no constitutional provision. 
CO~TCLUSION 
From the undisputed facts of this case, the respondent, 
without the benefit of statutary, legislative, case law 
or common law authority, seeks to obtain the benefit of 
appellant's property ·11hich appellants or their predecessors 
have been in possession of for BO years. In spite of 
statutory enactments, case law, and the passage of 80 
years and then only at the urging of a stranger to the 
title, the City has come forth to claim that appellants' 
possession of the land in question is without right. 
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·;:e respectfully set forth that u.rider the authorities, 
facts and circumstances herein set forth, the Order of 
the trial Court should be reversed and an ~ppropriate 
order stating that the land has been and nm1 is free 
of this Rdv~rse claim be rrade. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Delivered two copies of the foregoing brief to Judy Lever, 
attorney for plaintiff, respondent December 11, 1978. 
~"\ £;;/g;, 
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